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1Summary
Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, established in January 2007, is the latest 
in a long line of Algerian jihadi groups. Like many terrorist organizations, 
AQIM enjoys global media exposure on activist Internet sites, but unlike other 
al-Qaeda franchises, it has managed to maintain its indigenous leadership. The 
group has become known for fearsome suicide attacks, which were previously 
unheard of in Algeria, but has failed to incorporate the jihadi outfi ts from 
neighboring Morocco and Tunisia. AQIM has therefore focused on the north-
ern Sahara, carving out safe havens and threatening weak government forces, 
fi rst in Mauritania, and now increasingly in Mali.
At the outset, AQIM’s global strategy was based on the triangular dynamic 
of the Middle East (where Iraq serves as a magnet for potential recruits), 
North Africa (where the group functions as a regional jihadi recruiting hub), 
and Europe (where it pursues aggressive propaganda against the French and 
Spanish “Crusaders”). The demise of al-Qaeda in Iraq jeopardized this grand 
design, undermining AQIM’s capabilities on both sides of the Mediterranean, 
but although it primarily targets Western “Crusaders” in its own Algerian and 
Saharan environment, AQIM remains wedded to a global agenda.
The threat of AQIM must be contained, and hopefully, ultimately eradi-
cated. Algeria and the other targeted states have a long record of fi ghting similar 
jihadi networks, but they cannot confront transnational movements without 
international cooperation. To address this threat, regional security organiza-
tions can enhance much-needed bilateral exchanges among law enforcement 
and intelligence agencies. Additionally, the countries implementing the UN 
global strategy against terrorism should focus considerable attention on North 
Africa and the Sahel, where the threat is on the rise, but not yet out of control.
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Introduction
Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), launched in January 2007, is the 
most recently established franchise of Osama bin Laden’s jihadi network, and 
it is also the only one to have so far escaped the decline and crisis of the other 
branches of al-Qaeda in the Arab world. AQIM has enhanced its global profi le 
through its aggressive propaganda against Western “Crusaders,” with a spe-
cial focus against France and Spain, where parts of the jihadi networks dis-
mantled in 2005–2007 had Algerian connections. But the grand design of a 
North African integration of jihadi groups has largely failed, because AQIM’s 
recruitment and planning remain strongly Algerian. AQIM nurtures its most 
lethal potential of expansion via its Sahara networks. The jihadi focus against 
Mauritania has recently shifted toward Mali. International support for the tar-
geted states remains critical, but any direct Western involvement would be 
highly counterproductive.
The Legacy of the Civil War
AQIM is deeply rooted in Algeria’s recent history of violence and strife, but 
the organization’s heavy legacy limits its global potential. During the 1980s, 
hundreds of militant Algerians defi ed the Moscow-backed National Liberation 
Front (Front de Libération Nationale, FLN) by volunteering for the anti-Soviet 
jihad in Afghanistan. Even though most of them never left the training camps 
in Pakistan, they were nicknamed “Afghans” on their return in Algeria. The 
FLN one-party system had collapsed in 1988, but many Algerian “Afghans” 
refused to support the Islamic Salvation Front (Front Islamique du Salut, FIS) 
and its “political jihad.” They instead advocated military insurgency against 
the “apostate” regime and fueled the dynamics leading toward a full-fl edged 
civil war, especially after the Algerian authorities canceled the second round of 
parliamentary elections in January 1992. In October 1992, various jihadi guer-
rillas coalesced into the Islamic Armed Group (Groupe Islamique Armé, GIA), 
which initiated a terror campaign against the government forces, civil servants, 
secular intellectuals—but also the rival FIS. (See the timeline of key events.)
The 1990s are still known today in Algeria as the “black decade,” with over-
all estimates of the casualties ranging from 100,000 to 200,000 dead, most 
of them civilians. The hard core of the insurgency was based on 2,000 to 
3,000 fi ghters for the GIA, compared with 4,000 for the FIS. The GIA and 
the FIS mobilized international networks in the United Kingdom, and the 
jihadi propaganda in the British capital was so intense that it became called 
“Londonistan.” In 1995 the GIA, plagued with internal purges, also tried to 
outfl ank the FIS by launching a bombing campaign in France. In Algeria, the 
civilian population was increasingly targeted by the GIA, and dozens of mass 
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Timeline of Key Events in the North African Jihad
1991 November 28 Attack of the Guemmar border station by “Afghan” Algerian insurgents
1992 October Launching of the Islamic Armed Group (GIA) in Algeria
1993 July First issue of GIA newsletter Al-Ansar, published in London
1994 December 24 GIA hijacking of an Air France plane from Algiers to Marseille
1995 July 25 GIA bombing of a Métro station in Paris
1996 January Declaration of war by GIA against the rival Islamic Salvation Front (FIS)
1997 September Cease-fi re between the army and the FIS armed wing
1998 September Founding of the Salafi st Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) by a 
former GIA commander, Hassan Hattab
2001 September 9 Ahmed Shah Mas’ud, the leader of the anti-Taliban alliance, killed by two 
Tunisian jihadis sent by Osama bin Laden
2002 April 11 Al-Qaeda suicide attack against the Ghriba synagogue, on the Tunisian 
island of Djerba; 21 dead
2003 May 16 Suicide attacks in Casablanca; 45 dead, including 12 terrorists
2003 August Hattab replaced by Nabil Sahrawi as the GSPC’s leader (emir)
2004 June Sahrawi killed in a clash with the Algerian army; Abdelmalek Drukdal 
becomes GSPC’s leader
2005 July Abduction and execution of two Algerian diplomats by al-Qaeda in 
Baghdad
2006 September 13 Drukdal’s pledge of allegiance to bin Laden
2006 December 11 GSPC’s attack against a bus carrying employees from an American 
contractor; 1 dead
2007 January 24 GSPC’s name changed to al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)
2007 April 11 AQIM triple-suicide attack in Algiers; 30 dead
2007 December 11 AQIM double-suicide attack in Algiers; 41 dead, including 17 UN employees
2007 December 24 Four French tourists killed in Mauritania by AQIM
2008 August 19 AQIM suicide attack in the Algerian city of Boumerdes; 45 dead
2008 October 8 Death in Mosul of Al-Qaeda in Iraq’s deputy, the Moroccan Mohammed 
Moumou (Abu Quswara)
2008 December 14 AQIM’s abduction of the UN special envoy in Niger; released April 22, 2009
2009 May 31 AQIM’s execution of a British hostage
2009 June 30 AQIM’s verbal attacks against France, the “mother of all evils”
2009 July Offensive of Mali’s army against AQIM in the North of the country
2009 August 8 Foiled AQIM suicide attack against the French Embassy in Nouakchott
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slaughters were perpetrated in 1997, while the FIS reached a formal truce with 
the government. Divided and defeated, the GIA crumbled into local outfi ts, 
each one with its own commander or emir.
In 1998, one of these GIA commanders, Hassan Hattab, launched his own 
splinter organization, the Salafi st Group for Preaching and Combat (Groupe 
Salafi ste pour la Prédication et le Combat, GSPC). He pledged to refocus his 
military jihad against the security forces and to respect the civilian population. 
The truth is that the GSPC went on extorting money from the local peasantry 
in its mountainous stronghold in Kabylia, east of Algiers, but it stopped the 
random killings of whole “hostile” villages. Hattab attracted many dissatis-
fi ed GIA followers, like Abdelmalik Drukdal and Nabil Sahrawi, who had 
both joined the jihadi guerrillas in their early twenties. The GSPC even incor-
porated the GIA’s Saharan branch, which kept its operational autonomy but 
opened new windows of opportunity for the GSPC in neighboring countries. 
The highly mobile jihadi commandos roamed along smuggling routes in the 
desert and engaged in various kinds of illegal activities. The most profi table 
of these became the abduction of Western tourists, who were quickly moved 
across international borders before being traded for undisclosed ransoms. 
The Iraqi Dynamics
The GSPC emerged from Algeria’s “black decade” as the only serious jihadi 
challenger to the security forces. However, whereas Hattab opted for a rela-
tively low profi le, the younger commanders like Drukdal and Sahrawi pursued 
a more aggressive strategy. Having been raised and drilled in the Algerian kill-
ing fi elds, these seasoned leaders had survived numerous purges and ambushes 
and had grown attuned to global rhetoric. Thus they saw in the U.S. invasion 
of Iraq the possibility of exporting their own jihad. In August 2003, Hattab 
was forced to step down in favor of Sahrawi and Drukdal. A few months later, 
after Sahrawi was shot in a clash with security forces, Drukdal became the 
GSPC’s undisputed leader. Drukdal chose Abu Mus’ab Abdel Wadud as his 
moniker and began to cooperate with Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi’s network in 
Iraq, recruiting and channeling “volunteers” from all over North Africa.
The GIA had always kept its distance from al-Qaeda and consistently 
defended its full independence. Although it echoed al-Qaeda’s rhetoric against 
“the Jews and the Crusaders,” it rejected the involvement of foreigners in the 
Algerian jihad, while focusing its terror against France rather than the United 
States. The bombing campaign that the GIA waged on French soil in 1995 
did not involve al-Qaeda and relied heavily on the facilities enjoyed by the 
various jihadi groups in so-called Londonistan. But when Drukdal took over 
the GSPC eight years later, he feared the downward spiral of the Algerian 
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jihad and strove to replenish his organization by plugging it into the global 
realm. This is why he deliberately sought a closer link to al-Qaeda. Ayman al-
Zawahiri, bin Laden’s deputy, commissioned Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi and the 
Iraqi branch of the organization to manage this growing interaction with the 
GSPC. This jihadi pact was sealed with the blood of two Algerian diplomats 
who were abducted by al-Qaeda in Iraq in July 2005 and executed with the 
GSPC’s public endorsement.
Drukdal energized a regional web of smuggling routes and training facil-
ities, with the rallying call to fi ght the American “Crusaders” in Iraq. The 
GSPC managed to reach out to a new generation of activists, in both Algeria 
and its neighboring countries, evolving into the North African jihadi recruit-
ing hub for al-Qaeda in Iraq. American sources reckoned that in Iraq in 2005, 
one suicide bomber out of four was North African. This dramatic partner-
ship between the western (Maghreb) and eastern (Mashreq) branches of the 
jihadi community was very profi table for Drukdal, who gained an exposure 
unknown to any previous Algerian guerrilla leader in the global echo chamber 
of militant Internet sites. The GSPC leader found that the Iraqi mantra gave 
him privileged access to a pool of potential recruits, who were too disillusioned 
by the bloodbath of the “black decade” to join a purely Algerian jihad. This 
passionate commitment to an anti–United States jihad also served to reduce 
the appeal of the amnesty the new Algerian government offered to combatants 
who laid down their weapons, even though this call for reconciliation had 
convinced hundreds of former insurgents, including some GSPC militants, to 
return to some kind of normal life.
The deepening cooperation between the GSPC and al-Qaeda in Iraq was 
not affected by the killing in June 2006 of Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi, the orga-
nization’s leader. But Zawahiri was now ready to consider Drukdal’s offers to 
merge into the global jihad, because al-Qaeda central, based in the Pakistani 
tribal areas, planned on expanding its own networks westward. After months 
of protracted negotiations, Drukdal pledged public allegiance to bin Laden in 
September 2006 (in this way celebrating the fi fth anniversary of the September 
11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States), and, a few months later, his 
GSPC offi cially became al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. Yet despite this 
name change, the GSPC’s apparatus was left in place, though the Algerian 
leadership was expected to incorporate the other North African organizations 
and generate a truly regional dynamic, with Iraq as bait for new followers. 
The attempt to broaden AQIM into a Maghreb-wide organization was facili-
tated by the fact that the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, as well as the similar 
Moroccan and Tunisian groups, had lost their local base, and potential North 
African recruits had already been relying on the GSPC’s facilities to join the 
jihad inspired by al-Qaeda.
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The Campaign of Terror
AQIM’s opening strike occurred on April 11, 2007, with three simultaneous 
suicide bombings in Algiers, targeting the Government Palace, a police station, 
and a gendarmerie post. The date was chosen to commemorate the fi fth anni-
versary of al-Qaeda’s fi rst attack in North Africa, the bombing of the Ghriba 
synagogue on the Tunisian island of Djerba. The continuity with al-Qaeda—
proclaiming jihad against “the Jews, the Crusaders,” and their “apostate” allies 
(the Muslim regimes)—was therefore emphasized. Suicide attacks, which had 
been unknown in Algeria even during the “black decade,” became AQIM’s sig-
nature, with a string of devastating bombings following the three initial ones. 
A presidential motorcade was targeted in Batna on September 6, but President 
Abdelaziz Boutefl ika was unhurt. The combination of local and global terror 
culminated in the simultaneous suicide attacks in Algiers on December 11, 
which struck both the Algerian Constitutional Court and the regional seat of 
the United Nations.
However, this escalation of violence was not sustained in 2008, even though 
the number of suicide operations increased in Algeria. But these attacks proved 
less deadly, and there was a drop in overall jihadi military activity (the number 
of violent incidents involving AQIM fell from about 200 in 2007 to fewer 
than 150 in 2008). In retrospect, 2007 appears to have been an exceptional 
year, during which the GSPC/AQIM managed to stem the downward spiral 
of violence, but only temporarily. More than half of the forty-eight Algerian 
provinces were spared any jihadi violence in 2008; two-thirds of AQIM-
related incidents occurred in the three provinces of Boumerdes, Bouira and 
Tizi Ouzou, east of Algiers, which came to be known as the “death triangle.” 
Two factors contributed to this decrease in violence and its geographical 
containment. First, the Algerian government developed a more effective mili-
tary strategy for dealing with the renewed threat, focusing on mopping up the 
pockets of jihadi activism outside AQIM’s strongholds. Second, al-Qaeda in 
Iraq escalated its confl ict with the Sunni nationalist insurgency, and this badly 
tarnished the aura of al-Qaeda as a whole, thus decreasing AQIM’s ability to 
reach out to fresh recruits.
AQIM also failed in its attempt to transform itself into a North Africa–
wide organization. The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group merged directly into 
al-Qaeda central rather than into AQIM, while the Moroccan and Tunisian 
networks kept operating on an independent basis. The attraction of the fi ght 
in Iraq had opened up new grounds for regional cooperation in 2005–2006, 
but the crisis of al-Qaeda in Iraq, which was engulfed in a war with the local 
jihadis, forced AQIM to focus on a narrower Algerian agenda with limited 
appeal for neighboring partners. And in Algeria, AQIM grew increasingly 
associated with the worst of the old GIA’s terrorism, while the civilian toll 
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of the suicide attacks generated a popular backlash. In an attempt to over-
come this rejection, AQIM’s propaganda is now playing down the number of 
local casualties and exaggerating the “infi del” ones. For instance, AQIM 
claimed that the August 20, 2008 bombing of the bus transporting employees 
of a Canadian company had killed only Canadian expatriates, whereas all the 
casualties were Algerian.
The Saharan Perspective
AQIM’s failure to turn into a truly pan-Maghreb organization and to capture 
Islamist groups in neighboring countries did not put an end to its activities 
across the Algerian border in the Sahara. Such activities could build on the 
GSPC’s networks in the Sahara Desert, where it had long been engaged in 
smuggling a mix of drugs, weapons, and illegal immigrants, along with jihadi 
hit-and-run attacks against local security forces. 
This transnational threat was taken into account as early as 2003 by the 
United States, which launched the Pan Sahel Initiative (PSI). The PSI aimed 
to boost the rapid-reaction capacities of Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger 
by training and equipping at least one specialized company of about 150 sol-
diers in each of these four partner countries. In 2005, the PSI evolved into 
the more ambitious Trans-Saharan Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP), 
which included the four Sahel countries that had been part of the PSI as well 
as Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia in the Maghreb, and Nigeria and Senegal in 
West Africa. Libya was invited to join, but so far has declined the invitation. 
The TSCTP is offi cially a U.S. interagency program, but its main bureau-
cratic player remains the Pentagon, through the U.S. African Command, with 
a focus on joint exercises and communications interoperability between the 
member states’ armed forces. 
The GSPC’s early operations in the Sahara included its abduction of three 
dozen European tourists in Southern Algeria in 2003 and their release after 
months of tough bargaining. Its most serious military clash occurred in 
Mauritania, where it felt bold enough to attack an isolated military outpost 
in 2005. This Mauritanian dimension was enhanced with the launching of 
AQIM. Though the Algerian branch kept hunting for “infi del” targets, a jihadi 
commando killed four French tourists in Eastern Mauritania, on the eve of 
Christmas 2007 (the murderers were eventually arrested in Bissau, showing 
the plasticity of the regional network). This attack led to the cancellation of 
the Paris-Dakar car race, and this deprived AQIM of high-visibility soft targets 
and the subsequent media exposure. But in 2008 Mauritania remained the 
focus of AQIM’s operations in the Sahara, with a drive-by shooting against 
the Israeli Embassy in Nouakchott on February 1 and an ambush against a 
military patrol on September 15. 
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The abduction of Western travelers also continued, but on a random basis. 
Even though AQIM publicly demanded the release of jihadi prisoners, its local 
cells responsible for the kidnappings would not do so without being paid a ran-
som. This was the case with the two Austrian tourists kidnapped in Southern 
Tunisia in February 2008, who were released in Northern Mali eight months 
later. The same logic prevailed with the abduction of two Canadian UN dip-
lomats in Northern Niger, who were released in Mali in April 2009. Financial 
compensation, never admitted in public, probably ensured the safety of all 
these kidnapping victims. The only exception was the killing of a British tour-
ist in May 2009, which apparently was the result of direct pressure by AQIM’s 
leadership on the local commando, who was more interested in demanding 
ransom. However, AQIM released the three other European tourists who had 
been abducted along with the murdered Briton.
AQIM’s stronghold in the Sahara is buried inside the Tanezrouft Range, 
on the border between Algeria and Mali, while highly mobile jihadi comman-
dos roam from Mauritania to Chad. The recent increase in AQIM activity in 
Northern Mali has led to a very strong reply from Bamako, with a successful 
offensive launched in July 2009. But containment and deterrence are more 
attainable than a clear-cut military solution to this jihadi challenge.
“Global” Outreach
Even before its formal merger into al-Qaeda, the GSPC had endorsed the 
global jihadi rhetoric, and the newly founded AQIM was quick to target U.S. 
and Russian contractors in Algeria. In December 2007, AQIM bombed the 
UN headquarters in Algiers, echoing Zarqawi’s attack on the UN offi ces 
in Baghdad in July 2003. But AQIM’s leader, Drukdal, focused most of his 
threats against “Crusader France,” accusing Paris of supporting the “apos-
tate” regimes of North Africa, and against Spain, pledging to “purify” Ceuta 
and Melilla, the two Spanish enclaves in North Africa, as a fi rst step toward 
reconquering Andalusia (or al-Andalus). In the same way that Zarqawi’s anti-
Shi’a sectarianism had eventually contaminated the whole jihadi propaganda 
machine, Drukdal’s obsessions induced an escalation in al-Qaeda’s public hos-
tility against France and Spain. The Arab leaders of the global jihad hope that 
violent resentment against the former colonial powers can appeal to potential 
recruits, now that the struggle against the “Crusaders” in the Middle East is 
running out of steam. 
AQIM never managed to implement the grand strategy it envisaged, which 
centered on the anti–United States jihad in Iraq. In this strategy, AQIM, as 
the North African recruiting hub for the Middle East “battlefi eld,” expected to 
mobilize solidarity networks in Europe, mustering volunteers to be trained in 
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Algeria and sent on to Iraq. Indeed, a great proportion of the jihadi cells that 
were uncovered and dismantled in 2005–2007 in France and Spain had been 
working to send volunteers to either Iraq or training camps in Algeria—and 
the most dangerous ones did both. But the collapse of al-Qaeda in Iraq had a 
devastating impact on this triangular strategy. With the pull of participating 
in the jihad in Iraq gone, it became much more diffi cult for AQIM to recruit 
partners and militants in either Europe or North Africa. And the British crack-
down that followed the July 2005 bombings in London meant the end of the 
jihadi support networks there; AQIM could no longer rely on the facilities 
of “Londonistan” that had contributed to the GIA terror campaign against 
France in 1995.
With its triangular strategy frustrated by the demise of al-Qaeda in Iraq and 
its ability to conduct operations in Europe weakened, AQIM instead resorted 
to frantic attempts to hit “global” targets in its own environment. After sev-
eral foiled attempts against French expatriates, it fi nally succeeded in killing 
a French engineer in Lakhdaria, on June 8, 2008, in the explosion of two 
booby-trapped cars—and eleven Algerian civilians were also murdered. On 
June 23, 2009, AQIM gunned down an American humanitarian worker in 
Nouakchott. To enhance this sinister record, AQIM departed from its stan-
dard practice of bargaining for the release of Western tourists abducted in the 
Sahara and executed a British citizen, on May 31, 2009, as mentioned above. 
Despite this record, AQIM has so far been less violent than the other jihadi 
franchises, and especially al-Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula, which has killed 
more than a dozen foreign tourists in Yemen since 2007.
 The gap is therefore growing between AQIM’s global rhetoric and its 
terror record. During the January 2009 Israeli offensive on Gaza, Drukdal 
echoed bin Laden’s calls for global revenge against America and the West, 
but no operation was staged. Similarly, after the July 2009 repression of the 
Muslim riots in Chinese Xinjiang, AQIM pledged to retaliate against the 
growing Chinese community in Algeria, but no one followed suit. Drukdal’s 
recent denunciation of France as the “mother of all evils” has not triggered 
direct violence, and it took an extremely anti-French speech by Zawahiri, on 
August 5, 2009, to fi nally prompt AQIM into action with a suicide attack three 
days later against the French Embassy in Nouakchott, which was foiled.
Dealing with AQIM
The security paradox posed by AQIM is that its inability to project its “global” 
terror beyond Africa intensifi es the pressures from al-Qaeda central to achieve 
such a breakthrough and to force the Algerian jihadi leadership to live up to 
this commitment. This jihadi challenge must therefore be taken very seriously, 
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because AQIM is longing to reconcile its violent record with its global agenda. 
But jihadi propaganda must be systematically defl ated by stressing the fact that 
AQIM basically kills Algerian Muslims, most of them civilians.
The Internet has become the most vibrant vector of recruitment and 
mobilization for al-Qaeda inspired terror. The AQIM leader, Drukdal, gained 
enormous and dangerous prestige through his exposure on global jihadi web 
sites, so just monitoring those sites is clearly not enough; they must be actively 
disrupted. AQIM is only part of a worldwide picture, but it depends heavily 
on this access to the militant Internet, and therefore any achievement in even 
partially neutralizing e-jihad will be very damaging for AQIM.
Law-enforcement agencies in North Africa must cooperate more intensively 
to deter the terrorist threat. Bilateral exchanges have led to mutually profi table 
information sharing and even the extradition of terror suspects. But border 
management is a common concern and must be comprehensively addressed. 
The Union of the Arab Maghreb—composed of Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, 
Morocco, and Tunisia—would be the ideal framework, but it has no opera-
tional dimension. Therefore, two other forums need to be considered: the Arab 
League’s Council of Interior Ministers, with its secretariat in Tunis (with the 
risk of diluting the North African focus in a wider approach); and the African 
Union’s Center for Studies and Research on Terrorism, based in Algiers, with 
a network of focal points and an alert system (even though Morocco is not a 
member). This antiterrorist cooperation should be optimized in a pragmatic 
way, using bilateral channels whenever possible and opting for regional orga-
nizations when necessary.
The long-term, yet indirect, U.S. commitment through the TSCTP has 
proved benefi cial to the states involved, but it is essential that it remains indi-
rect and keeps a low profi le. Otherwise, it would give an incredible boost to 
the jihadi propaganda, which could pinpoint the interference of “Crusaders” 
on “Muslim lands,” and this must consistently be avoided. More generally, the 
Western powers should keep this self-imposed restraint in mind while extend-
ing the much-needed and protracted support for Mali and its neighboring 
states that have been targeted by AQIM.
The Euro-Mediterranean antiterrorism code of conduct adopted in 2005 
constitutes a welcome framework, shared by governments on both sides of the 
Mediterranean, for targeting al-Qaeda as a common threat with regional impli-
cations. It is very relevant to the fi ght against AQIM and must be reasserted. 
The United Nations’ global counterterrorism strategy, endorsed by the General 
Assembly in 2006, also provides a precious instrument through its comprehen-
sive approach and its criminalization of “incitement to commit a terrorist act,” 
while ensuring respect for human rights and the rule of law. These multilateral 
documents can prove mostly helpful in mobilizing the international commu-
nity against the jihadi threat in North Africa and the Sahel.
20079_CEIP_CP104_FNL-R1.indd   10 10/27/09   2:11 PM
11
About the Carnegie Endowment
The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace is a private, nonprofi t orga-
nization dedicated to advancing cooperation between nations and promot-
ing active international engagement by the United States. Founded in 1910, 
Carnegie is nonpartisan and dedicated to achieving practical results. Through 
research, publishing, convening and, on occasion, creating new institutions and 
international networks, Endowment associates shape fresh policy approaches. 
Their interests span geographic regions and the relations between governments, 
business, international organizations, and civil society, focusing on the eco-
nomic, political, and technological forces driving global change.
Building on the successful establishment of the Carnegie Moscow Center, the 
Endowment has added operations in Beijing, Beirut, and Brussels to its existing 
offi ces in Washington and Moscow, pioneering the idea that a think tank whose 
mission is to contribute to global security, stability, and prosperity requires a 
permanent international presence and a multinational outlook at the core of its 
operations. For more information, visit www.CarnegieEndowment.org.
Combining in-depth local knowledge with incisive comparative analysis, 
Carnegie’s Middle East Program examines politics in the Arab world. The 
Program studies extensively attempts at political reform, through detailed 
country studies and the exploration of key cross-cutting themes. The Program 
has special expertise on Islamist participation in pluralistic politics throughout 
the region. The Program publishes the Arab Reform Bulletin, a monthly elec-
tronic bulletin in English and Arabic assessing key political reform develop-
ments in the Arab world. In 2006, the Program opened the Carnegie Middle 
East Center in Beirut, Lebanon, a research center staffed by regional experts 
that will serve as a hub for independent analysis of political, economic, social, 
and security issues throughout the Middle East.
20079_CEIP_CP104_FNL-R1.indd   11 10/27/09   2:11 PM
Carnegie Papers
Carnegie Papers present new research by Endowment associates and their collabora-
tors from other institutions. The series includes new time-sensitive research and key 
excerpts from larger works in progress. Comments from readers are most welcome; 
please send an e-mail to pubs@CarnegieEndowment.org.
2009
Al-Qaeda  in the Islamic Maghreb: Algerian Challenge or Global Threat? (J. Filiu)
Five Alternatives that Make More Sense than Offshore Oil (W. Leonard)
Yemen: Avoiding a Downward Spiral (C. Boucek)
Warlords as Bureaucrats: The Afghan Experience (D. Mukhopadhyay)
Concrete Steps to Improve the Nonproliferation Regime (P. Goldschmidt)
Stepping Back From Democratic Pessimism (T. Carothers)
2008
Islamists in Politics: The Dynamics of Participation (M. Ottaway and A. Hamzawy)
Saudi Arabia’s “Soft” Counterterrorism Strategy: Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Aftercare (C. Boucek)
Can Trade Policy Support the Next Global Climate Agreement? Analyzing the International Trade 
and Environment Regimes (M. Lay)
The Russian World: Changing Meanings and Strategies (V. Tishkov)
The New Arab Diplomacy: Not With the U.S. and Not Against the U.S. (M. Ottaway and M. Herzallah)
Party for Justice and Development in Morocco: Participation and Its Discontents (A. Hamzawy)
International Labor Migration in a Globalizing Economy (R. Lucas)
Islam in Uzbekistan: Religious Education and State Ideology (M. B. Olcott, D. Ziyaeva)
Assessing Secretary of State Rice’s Reform of U.S. Foreign Assistance (G. F. Hyman)
The Draft Party Platform of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood: Foray Into Political
Integration or Retreat Into Old Positions? (N. J. Brown, A. Hamzawy)
2007
Incumbent Regimes and the “King’s Dilemma” in the Arab World: Promise and
Threat of Managed Reform (M. Ottaway and M. Dunne)
Implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1540: A Division of Labor Strategy (M. Heupel)
Demilitarizing Algeria (H. Roberts)
Fighting on Two Fronts: Secular Parties in the Arab World (M. Ottaway and A. Hamzawy)
Sufi sm in Central Asia: A Force for Moderation or a Cause of Politicization? (M. B. Olcott)
China’s Economic Prospects 2006–2020 (J. He, S. Li, and S. Polaski)
A Face of Islam: Muhammad-Sodiq Muhammad-Yusuf (M. B. Olcott)
Requiem for Palestinian Reform: Clear Lessons from a Troubled Record (N. J. Brown)
Evaluating Political Reform in Yemen (S. Phillips)
Pushing toward Party Politics? Kuwait’s Islamic Constitutional Movement (N. J. Brown)
For a complete list of Carnegie Papers, go to www.CarnegieEndowment.org/pubs.
20079_CEIP_CP104_FNL-R1.indd   12 10/27/09   2:11 PM
